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The Shift to Hybrid Pensions by U.S. Employers: 
An Empirical Analysis of Actual Plan Conversions 
 
Sylvester J. Schieber 
 
Abstract 
 
 For nearly two decades, employers have been restructuring traditional defined benefit 
pension plans to look and operate more like defined contribution plans from participants’ 
perspectives while retaining defined benefit funding characteristics.  This shift to cash balance 
and pension equity plans has become controversial because some participants and outside 
analysts have concluded the shift to these new plan styles has been primarily motivated by the 
desire to cut pension costs and reduce benefits.  This paper empirically documents the shift from 
traditional pension forms to these new hybrid forms for a sample of actual plan conversions.  The 
analysis investigates the implications of the plan conversions on plan costs and the levels and 
distribution of benefits.  If finds that some employers did indeed modify their plans to reduce 
costs but that, on average, cost savings from the shift to hybrid plans have been negligible.  The 
paper documents that some workers will receive smaller benefits under the new plans than they 
would under the old but shows that most plan sponsors implemented substantial grandfathering 
or other transition protection to eliminate or limit the effect of the transitions on workers with 
substantial tenure or age at the time of conversion.  The controversial “wear-away” is evaluated 
against provisions in the prior plans that provided subsidized benefits to early retirees and then 
reduced them if workers extended their career beyond early retirement eligibility.  It finds that 
wear-away has actually been ameliorated in the shift to hybrid plans although shifted forward in 
the career in most cases.  The paper shows that it is largely the elimination of these early 
retirement incentives that is at the heart of the shift to hybrid plans.  This shift is resulting in new 
incentives to work beyond early retirement ages and is redistributing benefits more equitably 
across the total workforce than traditional pensions have done. 
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Introduction1 
Over the past 15 to 20 years, many companies have converted their traditional defined 
benefit plans to hybrid-style plans, either cash balance or pension equity plans. In a cash balance 
plan, the worker’s "account" is based on an annual contribution rate for each year of 
employment, plus accumulating interest on annual contributions. A pension equity plan defines 
the benefit as a percentage of final average earnings for each year of service under the plan. Both 
types of plans specify and communicate the benefit in lump-sum terms payable at termination, 
rather than as an annuity payable at retirement, as is typical for defined benefit plans. Although 
from the employees’ perspective, these hybrid plans look somewhat like defined contribution 
plans, they are funded, administered, and regulated as defined benefit plans. So far, the shift 
toward hybrid pension plans has occurred primarily among larger employers. In several cases 
where corporate giants have switched to a hybrid plan, there has been considerable negative 
publicity about the conversions.   
The Basic Characteristics of Hybrid Pensions 
To a large extent, hybrid pensions are an attempt by employers to offer the more 
attractive features of both defined benefit and defined contribution plans in one plan, as shown in 
Table 1. In terms of contributions and participation, hybrid plans tend to resemble traditional 
defined benefit plans rather than self-directed defined contribution plans, in which employees 
decide whether to participate and select contribution rates. Hybrid plans largely eliminate 
penalties for workers who terminate employment before retirement, as is true with defined 
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contribution plans. The accumulation of accounts and provision of lump-sum benefits at 
termination facilitate communication and portability like 401(k) and similar plans.   
Table 1 here 
The new plans alleviate some  but not all  of the market risks of self-directed defined 
contribution plans. Account balances are credited with an annual rate of return equal to some 
specific rate such as the T-bill rate, thus reducing the investment risk faced by a typical defined 
contribution participant. Sponsors retain the investment risk with hybrid plans but typically 
guarantee an investment return to workers such that the expected return on plan assets should 
cover the cost of these risks. Workers retain some residual investment risk in that the benchmark 
rates used for return crediting of accounts can change over time, although they should be much 
less volatile than rates in many segments of the financial markets.2 Participants also risk the 
possibility of a plan sponsors’ changing the benchmark rates over time. 
Hybrid plans tend to be more age neutral in their retirement incentives than traditional 
defined benefit plans, and so far virtually none offers early retirement incentives, although a 
hybrid plan can be structured to include the same sorts of incentives offered by most traditional 
pensions. As defined benefit plans under law, hybrid plans must offer an annuity as a benefit 
option, but the overwhelming majority of these plans also offer lump-sum benefits. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that when offered a choice between an annuity and a lump sum, the 
overwhelming majority of workers choose the lump sum. 
Issues Raised in the Shift to Hybrid Pensions 
The shift to hybrid plans has been difficult to document, because there is not yet 
sufficient data to carefully track the changes adopted by employers. Bank of America 
implemented the first conversion  from a traditional pension to a cash balance plan  in 1985. 
 
 
3
But the trend was slow to take off, and by the close of 1999, there were only about 400 hybrid 
plans in operation, according to one estimate (Clark and Schieber, 2000).   
Despite the paucity of information documenting the shift to hybrid plans, there was 
plenty of adverse publicity suggesting motivations for these conversions. For example, a press 
release from Representative Bernie Sanders (D-VT) (2003) stated that, “Starting in the mid-
1990s, companies sought big savings by converting their employees’ traditional defined benefit 
pension plans… to cash balance plans.”  Richard Ippolito (2000) suggested another reason for 
the shift: “No one even pretends that these conversions to cash balance plans take place for any 
reason other than to avoid the reversion tax.”  After writing a number of articles for the Wall 
Street Journal about plan conversions, Ellen Schulz (1999) concluded that, “Growing complaints 
about age discrimination in cash-balance plans put a spotlight on a fairly new phenomenon: 
employers saving money by reducing retirement benefits for older workers.” 
Criticism of the shift to hybrid pensions has often suggested that plan sponsors are 
reducing benefits that people have earned under their former plans. While employers clearly are 
changing future accrual patterns, there is no evidence of plan sponsors having used a transition to 
hybrid plans to reduce benefits workers had already earned. In a study reviewing hybrid plan 
conversions, the Inspector General for the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL, 2002) stated that:  
For the 60 plans in our sample, we concluded that the conversions from traditional 
defined benefit plans to cash balance plans adequately protected benefits from earlier 
plans. Plan sponsors either (1) converted accrued benefits from earlier plans into cash 
balance accounts using various present value factors or (2) kept the accrued benefit 
separate. In either situation, all sponsors ensured that benefits paid after plan 
conversion exceeded accrued benefits from earlier plans as required by ERISA. 
Although benefits earned to date are not reduced by a shift to a hybrid plan, future accruals in the 
new plans may be reduced from what they would have been in the old plans, giving some 
workers the impression that they may lose benefits.   
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In almost all adoptions of hybrid pension plans, employers have replaced a traditional 
defined benefit plan. Because of the differences between hybrid and traditional plans, 
perceptions and results vary among different workers. Some perceive the shift from a traditional 
to a hybrid plan as a loss, while others consider it a significant gain.  
A Perspective on Benefit Reductions in the Transition to Hybrid Plans 
To see how a shift to a hybrid plan affects potential retirement benefits, consider the 
accrual of benefits for a worker hired at age 30 at a salary of $40,000 under a traditional defined 
benefit plan versus under the replacement cash balance plan. The implications of this conversion, 
shown in Figure 1, assume that the worker was employed throughout his or her entire career 
under each plan, and that the differences in accrual patterns had no offsetting effects on the pay 
on which the pension benefits were based. The amounts shown in the figure are the present value 
of accrued benefits in each of the two plans, stated as a multiple of pay at various ages. 
Figure 1 here 
If this worker quit this job before age 55 or so, he or she would be better off under the 
cash balance plan than the traditional pension. At around age 46 or 47, the difference becomes 
greatest, amounting to nearly one-half year’s pay. The advantage under the cash balance plan 
changes dramatically with early retirement eligibility under the traditional plan. By age 60, 
however, the traditional plan value exceeds that of the cash balance plan by nearly a half-year’s 
pay. Whether the traditional or the hybrid plan is better for this worker depends on how long he 
or she works for the plan sponsor. 
The implications of the shift in plan types vary considerably from employer to employer 
and from worker to worker. The overall level of generosity of the hybrid plan reflected in Figure 
1 is represented by the slope of the accrual line. Sponsors that trim total benefits in the shift to a 
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hybrid plan will have flatter accruals under their hybrid plan relative to their former plan than 
reflected in the figure. Sponsors that increase the overall generosity of benefits will have a 
steeper accrual under the hybrid plan relative to their former plan. A hybrid plan can be 
structured to increase accruals with age or service by giving larger credits as age or service 
increases. Some plan sponsors increase credits with age so they can provide competitive benefits 
for mid-career hires, who otherwise would not receive the same relative benefit as young hires 
due to shorter periods of interest compounding. Some plan sponsors increase credits with service 
to mimic the accrual pattern of traditional defined benefit plans.   
The comparison between traditional and hybrid pensions depicted in Figure 1 considers 
the outcomes for two similar workers under alternative plans. None of the controversy that 
surrounds conversions to hybrid plans is about the alternative scenarios depicted in the figure. 
The controversy is about what happens to workers who already have been covered for some time 
under a traditional plan when the sponsor shifts to the new plan.   
Consider the case depicted in Figure 2 where a 50-year-old worker was covered under a 
traditional plan for 20 years before the transition to a new cash balance plan. If the worker's 
initial cash balance in the new plan equals the accrued benefit under the prior plan and benefits 
increase under the new accrual pattern, the initial benefit would be set at point B in the figure. 
Benefits would accrue going forward at the new plan rate, providing the worker with a benefit of 
value C at age 65, equivalent to two years pay. This worker would essentially get the worst of 
both the traditional and hybrid plan worlds. He or she would have been covered by the traditional 
plan in the early career years, when accruals are very low, but would have missed out on the 
higher accruals of the later career years. 
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Figure 2 here 
To remedy situations like this, some plan sponsors create a starting balance for these 
workers as though they had participated in the hybrid plan all along, setting the initial benefit at 
point A and having future benefits accrue from that point forward under the new plan. While this 
vastly improves on the previous scenario for the mid-career worker, it still may not satisfy many 
workers caught in the transition to new plans. A 50-year-old worker with 20 years of service who 
anticipates retiring with a generous early retirement benefit in five years often receives a smaller 
benefit under the new formula than he or she would have received under the old plan.  
Some employers have chosen to grandfather workers relatively close to retirement 
eligibility under the old plan, letting them finish out their career under its terms. Others have 
converted everyone to the new plan but have essentially grandfathered workers with long service 
or close to retirement by giving them a supplemental balance that makes up for benefits lost in 
the transition to the new plan. But grandfathering some workers and not all creates its own set of 
problems, requiring somewhat arbitrary decisions about the age and service cutoffs for staying in 
the old plan or being covered by the new. Under such provisions, variations of a day or two in 
age or service can result in workers receiving disparate benefits, which are hard to justify. 
Some employers have allowed workers to choose between the old and new plans, but this 
approach does not always end well either. Assume the hypothetical worker in Figure 2 may 
choose between staying in the old plan or joining the new plan with an initial balance of A. 
Suppose she chooses to remain in the old plan but is then terminated in a downsizing or plant 
closing two years later. She based her choice on the assumption that she would continue 
employment under the old plan until her accumulated benefit exceeded that of the new plan, but 
in hindsight, she made the wrong choice and so will receive a lower benefit. 
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The Perspective on Frozen Benefits in Pension Conversions   
Another concern about the transition to hybrid plans is where a worker is converted to the 
new plan with an opening balance that remains frozen for some period. This is commonly 
referred to as "wear-away" of earned benefits. There are essentially two situations under which 
wear-away occurs.   
The first arises where employers significantly curtail the generosity of their pension plan 
in adopting the hybrid plan. In conversions to pension equity plans, initial balances in the new 
plan are often set by treating workers as though they were covered under it for the full duration 
of their employment with the plan sponsor. If the new formula results in benefits that are less 
than the accrued benefits under the old plan, a worker with substantial service under the old plan 
may work for some period without accruing added benefits because the accumulated benefit in 
the new plan has to catch up with the frozen benefit in the old one.   
In conversions to cash balance plans, initial balances are typically set on the basis of 
workers' age and service under the prior plan at the point of conversion. If the plan sponsor uses 
a higher interest rate in calculating the value of initial benefits in the new plan than in 
determining the present value of the accrued benefit of the prior plan, initial benefits in the new 
plan would be less than accrued benefits in the prior plan. Participants would have to work 
without earning a benefit for some time simply to allow the lump-sum benefit under the new plan 
to catch up to the benefit already accrued under the old plan. This problem of initial account 
balances in new plans being set below accrued benefits in prior plans in conversions to hybrid 
plans appears to have been largely resolved by the 1994 Uruguay Round of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  GATT changed the rates plan sponsors could use for 
determining lump-sum benefits (Brown et al., 2000).  
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The second wear-away situation arises where the plan sponsor does not provide a benefit 
in the new plan that was offered in the old one, as depicted in Figure 3. In this case, the worker 
has already reached early retirement age under the previous plan and receives an initial credit 
under the new plan equal to the value A, his accrued benefit under the old formula. Assume that 
under the new plan, the initial benefit is reflected at level B in the figure. This situation could 
arise in converting to a pension equity plan because the formula results in a benefit accrual 
pattern shown by the solid line in the figure. The new plan eliminates the early retirement 
subsidy and simply provides a lower accrual at age 56. This situation could arise in a conversion 
to a cash balance plan because the benefit value in the new plan is the lump-sum value of the 
accrued benefit. ERISA does not require that plan sponsors "vest" the value of early retirement 
subsidies if retirees take their benefits in the form of a lump sum.  
Figure 3 here 
In this case, the credited value of the benefit under the new plan, at point B, for the 
worker in Figure 3 would be less than his accrued benefit earned under the prior plan. While 
ERISA does not permit an employer to reduce a worker's accrued benefit, the employer may 
freeze the benefit. The wear-away in this situation arises because plan sponsors have frozen 
benefits for these workers until the benefit in the new plan catches up with the accrued benefit 
under the old plan.   
Given the widespread prevalence of early retirement incentives in traditional plans, this 
second wear-away situation could potentially occur in almost all conversions to hybrid plans. Yet 
in many plan conversions, wear-away has not occurred at all or occurred only in a very limited 
number of cases. The reason is that many plan sponsors chose to sweeten the benefit under the 
new plan. For example, plan sponsors might give workers some added credits under the new 
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plan, or calculate the initial balance in the new plan using a lower interest rate than was used to 
calculate the accrued benefit in the old plan.   
Technically, if the plan sponsor has enhanced the initial benefit in the hybrid plan, the 
benefit could be frozen for some period of time, thus creating a wear-away period. It would not 
make much sense, however, for a plan sponsor to enhance an initial benefit and then freeze it. In 
fact, when an employer enhances the initial benefit for workers on the cusp of retirement, it often 
improves the pension accrual levels for broad cross sections of the covered workforce. To the 
extent that any wear-away conditions might arise in such plan conversions, sponsors will 
generally adopt other transition provisions that will hold workers close to retirement age whole 
under the prior plan's provisions. 
Another situation sometimes arises in the transition to hybrid plans that may be perceived 
as creating wear-away, due to variations in interest rates used to establish plan balances at the 
time of conversion. Under GATT, plans use 30-year Treasury rates in determining lump-sum 
values of benefits. While a plan can use the most recent month's closing rate, it can also use a 
closing quarterly, semiannual, or annual rate. To show how this may create the perception of 
wear-away, consider a plan that traditionally used the closing September rate from the prior year 
in calculating lump-sum benefits. A sponsor transitioning to a hybrid plan on December 31, 
1999, would have used an interest rate of 5.20 percent to calculate initial balances. One 
transitioning on January 1, 2000, would have used a 6.07 percent rate. In this case, converting on 
the later of the two days would have significantly reduced the value of initial benefits. This 
would require workers to work some period under their new plan to get back to the value of 
benefits in their old plan just before the transition, which is often thought of as wear-away. In 
fact, the value of accrued benefits in the old plan would have dropped just as much on January 1, 
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2000, due to the shift in interest rates, as they did in the conversion to the new plan because of 
the chosen methodology for calculating accrued benefits. In this case, something totally 
extraneous to the plan conversion creates the reduction in accrued benefits. 
Sorting Out the Implications of Hybrid Plan Conversions 
The shift to hybrid pension plans has been explained in terms of employers’ desire to 
reduce costs, to avoid tax obligations from shifting to defined contribution plans, to cut benefits 
for older workers, and so forth. All these theories have some credibility in the public arena. None 
of these criticisms, however, captures the scope or nuance of the shift to these new plans. In early 
2000, Kyle Brown and several of his colleagues published an analysis of the shift to hybrid plans 
that focused on the pre- and post-conversion characteristics of 78 plans for which they had 
detailed plan characteristics. At that time, the authors estimated their sample of plans included 
nearly one-quarter of all plans converted to a hybrid form. About 60 percent of the plans were 
cash balance plans and the rest were pension equity plans. Subsequently, Robert Clark and 
Sylvester Schieber used 77 of these plans to extend the analysis of the implications of the shift to 
hybrid plans (Clark and Schieber, 2000, 2002, forthcoming).  
In the following discussion, we rely on the 77 plans included mutually in the various 
analyses undertaken by Brown et al. and Clark and Schieber. Of these conversions, 46 were to 
cash balance plans and 31 were to pension equity plans. All plan conversions are treated as 
though they occurred in 1999, to allow comparisons of the implications of the transitions for 
workers of given characteristics in any given year.   
Analysis of the Changes to Pension Costs in the Shift to Hybrid Plans 
One element of the analysis of the shift to hybrid plans undertaken by Brown and his 
colleagues was a set of actuarial expense calculations to see how the shift affected plan sponsors’ 
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accounting costs. Their analyses did not directly replicate the actual changes in costs these plan 
sponsors incurred and reported on their financial statements.   
In analyzing the effects of shifting to hybrid plans on pension costs, Brown et al used a 
synthetic workforce of 10,000 workers to value each plan before the shift to a hybrid plan and 
afterwards, rather than the actual workforces. This synthetic workforce was a randomly selected 
sample of workers drawn from a combined pool of roughly 165,000 workers from 15 of Watson 
Wyatt’s larger clients. For each worker, the authors had his or her date of birth, date of hire, and 
pay level. They used turnover assumptions consistent with patterns at large firms offering a 
defined benefit plan. They did not use plan-specific turnover experience, although they applied 
higher turnover rates to health and hospital employer plans than to other employer plans, because 
turnover in that sector is typically somewhat higher than in other economic sectors where 
pension plans are prevalent. 
In reporting their results, the authors (Brown et al., 2000) segregated the plans into three 
groups. In the first group, the shift to a hybrid plan reduced pension costs. In the second group, 
the shift was cost-neutral. In the third group, the shift actually increased pension costs. If the 
shift increased or decreased costs by 5 percent or less, it was considered cost-neutral. Of the 
defined benefit plans alone, 56.4 percent of the plans reduced pension costs, 20.5 percent were 
cost-neutral, and 23.1 percent increased pension costs. Overall, the shift to hybrid plans reduced 
average costs by 10.3 percent on a projected unit cost basis. The authors surmised that part of the 
rationale for the cost shifts was that plan sponsors were attempting to more closely align their 
accrued benefit obligation (ABO) and projected benefit obligation (PBO) used for accounting 
purposes.  
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The analysis suggests that most plans reduced costs in the shift to hybrid plans with a net 
aggregate reduction occurring across all plans. Further analysis, however, found that many plan 
sponsors reduced pension costs but enhanced their defined contribution plan at the same time. 
Putting more money into a defined contribution plan at the same time as adopting a hybrid plan 
would be consistent with a strategy of redesigning a retirement system to more closely align the 
ABO and PBO. Under defined contribution plans, the employer’s accrued and projected 
expenses are identical.   
After recalculating the cost analysis to factor in the effect of the defined contribution plan 
enhancements and assuming that workers take full advantage of the enhancements, the results 
were very different. In this case, 44.9 percent of the plan sponsors reduced their pension costs, 
17.9 percent spent approximately the same amount, and 37.2 increased their pension costs. 
Overall, average plan costs were reduced by 1.4 percent (Brown et al., 2000). In other words, the 
average change in retirement plan costs was so negligible in aggregate that the shift in plan 
designs can be characterized as essentially cost-neutral, though of course this may not be the case 
for specific employers. 
Analysis of the Funding Status of Plans Converted to Hybrid Forms 
If an employer has an overfunded, traditional pension plan and decides to shift toward a 
defined contribution approach, today’s regulatory environment strongly encourages sponsors to 
adopt a hybrid plan as opposed to a defined contribution plan. This is why some people conclude 
that the shift to hybrid plans has been largely driven by tax considerations. There are two factors 
that support this conclusion. 
The first is that shifting from a defined benefit to a defined contribution plan requires the 
plan sponsor to terminate its defined benefit plan and purchase annuities for the plan’s accrued 
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benefits through the insurance markets, which introduces extra costs. The second is the excise 
tax levied on excess assets left in the terminated defined benefit plan after all plan obligations 
have been paid off, which is virtually expropriative.  
If an employer terminates a defined benefit plan, substitutes a defined contribution plan, 
and has remaining assets, the employer can avoid the excise tax by allocating a pro-rata 
distribution of assets across the participant population at the point of conversion, subject to 
annual contribution limits. Employers seldom do this because it provides tremendous windfall 
benefits to plan participants. Another alternative is for a sponsor with excess assets in a 
terminating defined benefit plan to reduce the excise tax obligation by transferring 20 percent of 
the excess to increase termination benefits across the board. For sponsors that choose this option, 
both excise and income taxes are assessed on only 80 percent of the excess assets in the plan and 
the excise tax rate drops to 20 percent. Yet a third alternative allows the sponsor to transfer 25 
percent of excise taxes into a suspense account, which can then be allocated to workers' defined 
contribution accounts over seven years. In this option, the excise and income tax applies to only 
75 percent of excess assets and the excise tax rate is reduced to 20 percent. Finally, a fourth 
variant allows the sponsor to transfer all the excess assets into a suspense account that can then 
be allocated to workers' defined contribution accounts over seven years. In this case, there is no 
income tax obligation on the excess assets and a 20 percent excise tax is applied to only 75 
percent of excess assets.   
Regardless of which option a plan sponsor chooses, the shift from a defined benefit plan 
with excess assets to a defined contribution plan entails extra taxes or benefit-allocation 
implications that most employers would rather avoid. Employers that convert a traditional 
defined benefit plan with excess assets to a hybrid plan do not incur any excise taxes. The excess 
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assets in the original plan simply roll over to the modified plan. It would not be farfetched to 
make a case that a business manager with substantial excess funding in a traditional pension 
would be violating his or her fiduciary responsibility to the business owners by shifting to a 
defined contribution plan. Taking on unnecessary tax obligations when there is an alternative that 
avoids those tax consequences could be viewed as a failure on the part of management to 
properly protect the interest of stockholders. 
In order to determine the relative funding status of hybrid versus ongoing traditional 
defined benefit plans, Clark and Schieber compared the relationship between plan assets and 
current liability obligation under the law. In a plan termination, the plan sponsor must 
immediately vest all benefits. Thus, a reasonable measure of plan liability includes all vested and 
non-vested benefits as of a particular date. Clark and Schieber found that plans that were 
converted to hybrid plans were more likely to have funding levels between 90 and 130 percent of 
their current liability than all defined benefit plans — 65 versus 53 percent. At the tails of the 
funding distribution, hybrid plans were somewhat less represented compared to all defined 
benefit plans. The data do not support the contention that all plans were overfunded, as nearly 
one-quarter of the converted plans had assets of less than their current liability. 
Even though the current liability that Clark and Schieber used suggests that hybrid plans 
are somewhat better funded than ongoing traditional plans, their analysis does not suggest that 
most of these plans would have realized substantial excess assets in a plan termination. In 
shutting down a plan, the plan sponsor must purchase annuities for the accrued benefits of all 
plan participants. A Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation analysis (PBGC, 1995) of 10 large 
plans with assets in excess of 125 percent of current liability estimated that their average assets 
would cover only 95 percent of the level needed to terminate the plans.   
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There is a strong likelihood that plan sponsors’ desire to avoid the inefficiency of going 
to commercial annuity markets to shut down their plans was as important a motivator to stick 
with their defined benefit plan structures as the desire to protect assets against excise taxes.  
Many if not most of the plans were simply not sufficiently over funded to have been exposed to 
significant asset losses from the excise taxes imposed on asset reversions.  Among the converting 
plans that Clark and Schieber linked to Form 5500 data, 56 percent had assets of less than 120 
percent of current liability, and 72 percent had assets of less than 130 percent of current liability 
at the end of their 1996 plan year. For some of them, assets may have appreciated in subsequent 
years given financial market performance, but with falling interest rates annuity conversions 
would have become somewhat more costly as well. Some plans that were converted to hybrid 
plans undoubtedly held excess assets at the point of conversion, but Clark and Schieber 
concluded that the data do not support any notion that the shift to hybrid plans is simply a 
mechanism by which overfunded plans avoid excise taxes. This is not to say that an employer 
with an overfunded pension plan who wants to adopt a plan with defined contribution 
characteristics does not have good reasons to go the hybrid plan route. 
The Shift to Hybrid Plans and the Elimination of Early Retirement Subsidies 
Figures 1 through 3 clearly show that accrual patterns in the plans reflected in them were 
different in the hybrid plan compared to the traditional pension it replaced.  A significant element 
of the difference is related to the treatment of early retirement under the respective plans.  This 
analysis begins with two hypothetical workers to show how benefits changed across a range of 
plan conversions. The first worker is hired at age 30 for $25,000 per year. Here, the benefits 
under the hybrid plan in each of the 77 conversion cases are compared with the benefits that 
would have been provided under the prior plan at two different points in this worker's career. The 
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first comparison is when the worker is 40-years-old and has ten years of service. The second is 
20 years later, when the worker is 60-years-old and has put in 30 years of service.   
The second worker is 50-years-old, earns $50,000 per year and has put in 20 years of 
service under the traditional pension plan at the time of conversion. The analysis compares the 
benefits provided by the hybrid to those under the prior plans at two points in time. The first 
comparison is at the point of transition to the new plan. As the earlier discussion intimated, some 
workers fairly advanced in age and service might realize immediate gains or apparent losses at 
the point of conversion to the new plan. The second point of comparison is ten years later, when 
the worker is age 60 with 30 years of service. The analysis compares the benefits actually 
provided under the new regime with those that would have been provided had the prior plan 
remained in effect until the worker reached age 60.3  The results of this analysis are presented in 
Table 2. 
Table 2 here 
The overwhelming majority of the plan conversions increased benefits for the young new 
hires who terminate their employment after ten years with the employer. Only one hybrid plan in 
the entire sample of 77 plans reduced benefits for these workers relative to the prior plan. If the 
worker remains with the firm until age 60, however, the vast majority of plans would pay a 
reduced benefit relative to the prior plan. Only 22 percent of plans would match or increase the 
benefit for this worker at age 60 relative to the prior plan.   
For the 50-year-old worker 20 years into a career at the point of transition, the story is 
somewhat similar to that of the new hire. If the worker leaves almost immediately after the 
transition to the new plan, he or she would be as well or better off under the hybrid plan than 
under the former plan in 94 percent of cases.4 If this worker stayed with the firm until age 60, 
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however, he or she would be worse off after the conversion in 55 percent of cases. The 
potentially adverse consequences of plan conversions on older, long-tenured workers described 
earlier appear to be borne out in most shifts to hybrid plans. However, this is far from the whole 
story of the shift to hybrid plans for older workers. 
Table 3 is similar to Table 2, except that it shows the distribution of benefits under 
pension equity and cash balance plans relative to the prior plan for the 30-year-old worker used 
in developing Table 2. Here the focus is on the worker who is 30-years-old at the time of 
transition, because the differences in the results at each termination age reflect the true 
differences in the two types of plans. Table 3 suggests that pension equity and cash balance plans 
are quite similar in their treatment of workers relative to the plans they replaced. It does not 
appear that employers have favored one type of hybrid over the other in the interest of cutting or 
expanding benefits. In almost all cases, both types of hybrid plans have increased benefits to 
young workers who terminate relatively early in their careers with vested benefits. In most cases, 
the hybrid plans deliver fewer benefits to the long-career, 60-year-old worker than he or she 
would receive under the old plan.   
Table 3 here 
While not shown separately here, some conversions to both types of hybrid plans 
ultimately reduced benefits for workers with some tenure at transition who terminate 
employment at ages where they would have qualified for immediate retirement benefits, 
especially early retirement benefits, under the prior plan. This phenomenon is so important that it 
deserves deeper exploration. 
In the figures discussed here thus far, the early retirement incentives embedded in 
traditional defined benefit plans are shown by the marked increase in benefits at age 55. In 
 
 
18
contrast, virtually all the hybrid plans we have seen share the general pattern of benefit accrual 
shown for hybrid plans in Figures 1 to 3. The actual accrual pattern in a specific plan may be 
steeper, flatter, or more concave, but very few of these plans include the type of actuarial early 
retirement subsidies featured in the overwhelming majority of traditional pensions. This does not 
mean early retirement subsidies cannot be added to hybrid plans. But the fact that employers 
convert traditional pension plans that feature early retirement subsidies to hybrid plans without 
such subsidies suggests that employers are deliberately eliminating the early retirement 
incentives so popular with employers since the 1960s or 1970s. 
Earlier we noted that Brown and his colleagues had separated the conversion of 
traditional pension to hybrid plans into three groups: cost reducers, cost-neutral shifters, and cost 
increasers. Clark and Schieber similarly grouped plans by their cost adjustments but did so by 
comparing cost outcomes to the savings realized by eliminating early retirement incentives. In 
the shift to a hybrid plan, the first group reduced plan costs by more than the cost of the early 
retirement subsidies. The second group reduced plan costs, but by less than they would have by 
simply eliminating early retirement subsidies. The third group increased plan costs. 
The nature of the shift in benefits in the first group of plans is reflected in Figure 4. The 
vertical line in the figure helps sort out the benefit adjustments in the plan shift, in this case for a 
58-year-old worker. For a worker who began coverage under the old plan at age 30 with a 
starting salary of $40,000, the value of the accrued benefit at age 58 would have been 3.19 times 
pay as reflected by point A in the figure. If the employer simply eliminated the early retirement 
subsidy in the old plan but otherwise kept the prior formula, the accrued benefit for this worker 
at age 58 would have been 1.88 times pay, as reflected by point B. But under the newly adopted 
hybrid plan, the accrued benefit is only worth 1.31 times pay, reflected by point C.  
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Figure 4 here 
Of the total reduction in benefits in the shift to a hybrid plan for the worker depicted in 
Figure 4, 70 percent relates to the loss of early retirement subsidies. The remainder is due to 
additional benefit cutbacks made in the shift to the hybrid plan. In this situation, for workers who 
stay longer into their career, the total reduction in benefit will become larger and more of it will 
be due to general benefit reductions as opposed to curtailment of early retirement incentives. As 
is clear from the figure, the losers in this type of shift are workers with extended tenures and 
those who continue working beyond early retirement eligibility under the prior plan formulas. 
Workers with short tenures emerge slightly better off under the new plan, but their gains are 
often relatively moderate. For the very long-tenured worker, benefits under the new plan will 
never equal the prior plan benefit under any reasonable career extensions. 
The benefit adjustments by the second group of employers are depicted by Figure 5. In 
this case, the accrued benefit at age 57 for the worker under the old plan, Point A, would have 
been worth 3.58 times pay. Elimination of the early retirement subsidy would have reduced the 
value of this benefit, Point B, to 2.07 times pay. But the value of the benefit provided by the new 
formula, Point C, would be 2.66 times annual pay. In other words, this employer took some of 
the savings from eliminating the early retirement subsidy and plowed them back into the plan.  
Figure 5 here 
Here it is clear workers who leave with relatively short tenures or before early retirement 
eligibility will be better off in the new plan. This is the same plan as depicted in Figure 3. It 
indicates that the shift will also benefit workers who work beyond the normal retirement age in 
the old plan. This is because many traditional plans have service caps, but hybrid plans hardly 
ever have such limits. 
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Once an employee reaches the maximum tenure on which service credits are given under 
a pension plan, a pay increase is the only factor that can drive up benefits. Thus, when a worker 
reaches a service cap, working an extra year generally does little to increase annual pension 
benefits. But failing to take a benefit during a year of eligibility reduces the period over which 
the pension can be drawn. Given typical wage growth patterns late in workers' careers, failing to 
take the pension once a worker reaches the service cap often means that the present value of 
benefits actually declines under traditional plans. Among the plan conversions studied here, 42.9 
percent of the original plans had service caps that would have come into play for our 
hypothetical worker by the time he or she reached age 60. At age 65, 55.8 percent of the plans 
had caps that would have limited benefits. In all, 64.9 percent of these plans had service caps. 
Figure 6 reflects the implications of the elimination of early retirement incentives by the 
third group of plans. In this case, it is unambiguous that the hybrid plan will cost more than the 
old plan even with its early retirement subsidies. Generally, this sort of plan conversion has not 
been controversial, although the retirement wealth implications of these shifts are not as clear as 
the figure suggests. Most of these shifts appear to include adjustments to retiree health benefits, 
suggesting that some employers have increased their pension costs at the same time they reduced 
their direct funding for retiree health plans. These changes may represent an effort by employers 
to restructure retirement packages so that workers accumulate funds in individual accounts to 
pay for access to the company medical plans after retirement.   
Figure 6 here 
Since employers cannot tax-effectively prefund retiree health insurance plans, the 
benefits create significant liabilities for the sponsors. But employers can effectively fund extra 
retirement income through added pension accumulations in hybrid plans or enhanced 401(k) 
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plans that retirees can use to purchase health insurance. Such plans allow retirees to use their tax-
deferred savings plans to pay insurance premiums in their employers' health plans. This 
eliminates the liabilities created under the old approach while enabling plan sponsors to offer 
former workers an efficient means of securing retiree health insurance. 
Figures 4 through 6 tell two stories about the shift to hybrid plans. One is that different 
groups of employers did very different things with the money they saved by eliminating early 
retirement subsidies. The second is that the shift to a hybrid plan can reduce benefits for certain 
workers over the remainder of their working careers, even when the savings from eliminating 
early retirement benefits are plowed back into the plan. Indeed, even when employers 
significantly increased their pension costs, some workers will be worse off under their new plan 
than they would have been under the old one. This occurs because the shift to a hybrid plan is, at 
least in part, a redistribution of pension benefits across a workforce over time. 
Table 4 shows the effects of the shift to hybrid plans for three hypothetical workers and 
the extent to which the three scenarios depicted above came into play. In every case reflected in 
the table, most of the hybrid plans reduced benefits for the prototypical workers by less than 
would have occurred had they simply eliminated early retirement subsidies. For cases where the 
worker is assumed to retire at age 55, less than one-fifth of the plans would reduce benefits by 
more than the elimination of the early retirement subsidies. For these workers, 39 to 64 percent 
of the plans would actually enhance benefits relative to the old plan despite having eliminated 
the early retirement subsidies.   
Table 4 here 
While the elimination of early retirement subsidies does not account for all reductions in 
benefits in the shift to hybrid plans, it plays the largest part. The other cause is a general 
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reduction in retirement benefits. Plan sponsors are free to reduce retirement benefits, whether as 
part of a shift to a hybrid plan or within an existing defined benefit plan. 
The reduction of benefits for selected workers occurs in a relative rather than an absolute 
context. No worker ends up with smaller benefits than he or she had earned at the point of plan 
conversion. Rather, these workers receive smaller benefits at retirement under the hybrid plan 
than they would have earned under the old plan. Brown and his colleagues analyzed the 
implications of the shift to a hybrid plan by simulating their synthetic workforce through a plan 
conversion. In developing their analysis, the authors focused on a cost-neutral plan conversion. 
The distributions of winners and losers in a sample cost-neutral cash balance conversion taken 
from Brown and his colleagues’ analysis are shown in Table 5.  
Table 5 here 
The benefits distribution pattern reflected in Table 5 could suggest that certain age groups 
are particularly disadvantaged by the shift to the new plans. For example, of all workers who 
experience reductions, workers in their 40s or early 50s generally face larger reductions than 
either younger or older workers. Of all those who profit from the shift to a cash balance plan, the 
benefit increases tend to be largest for workers in their 20s or 30s and for short-tenured workers. 
Although those observations reflect the implications of the shift to a cash balance plan in this 
instance, they ignore the starting place from which the shift originated. 
Many people fail to realize that under a traditional defined benefit plan, a 
disproportionate share of benefits accrues to a relatively small number of participants, namely 
those who stay with the employer until they retire. This is not terribly surprising given that, at 
least in part, these plans were originally set up to reward workers who stayed with the plan 
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sponsor. In many cases, the shift to a hybrid plan counteracts  but does not completely 
eliminate  this disproportionate distribution of benefits.  
Table 6 shows future accrual of pension value stated as a percentage of pay for supposed 
winners and losers in this shift to a cash balance plan. To derive this, the present value of 
benefits that would be paid at termination for each worker was calculated and compared to the 
present value of the accrued benefit at the time of the shift. The difference in the two is the 
additional amount each worker earns between the point of transition and his or her departure 
from the company. This difference is divided by the present value of future earnings while still 
with the employer. The result is what actuaries refer to as the aggregate normal cost, reflecting 
the accrual of future benefits as a constant percentage of pay over the remainder of workers’ 
careers with the employer.   
Table 6 here 
The top section of Table 6 reflects the accrual rate for workers who would be better off 
under the cash balance plan than under the prior plan, and the bottom reflects those who would 
be worse off. In every age and service category at transition, the “losers” will continue to accrue 
pension value at a higher rate than the “winners.” Table 5 may suggest that this conversion was 
unfair to the 20 percent or so of workers who were worse off after the transition. But Table 6 
suggests that this employer has simply introduced a more equitable allocation of pension benefits 
among all workers  those who remain with the employer until retirement age and those who 
terminate employment before then. 
In fact, as shown in Figure 7, at the point of conversion the median hybrid plan was 
significantly better than the plan it replaced for many long-service workers. This is true even for 
workers at age 50 with 20 years of service at the time of conversion. The new median benefit 
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level is 1.48 times larger than the median benefit level for the old traditional plan, refuting the 
contention that hybrid plans are always less favorable for long-service employees. Under any 
common understanding of what constitutes a long period of service, a worker with 20 years of 
service with the same employer would be considered a long-service employee.  
Figure 7 here 
In addition to providing an average benefit that is 50 percent larger than the benefit from 
the previous traditional plan, almost 85 percent of the hybrid plans provide a benefit at least as 
valuable as the prior plan benefit for long-service workers. Despite the results shown in Figure 7, 
some long-service workers are convinced that they are adversely affected by the transition from a 
traditional pension to a hybrid plan. This is because the probabilities of continuing employment 
with the same employer until age 55 are very different for these workers than for 30-year-old 
new hires. Many older workers caught in the conversion to hybrid plans were looking forward to 
the early-retirement bonanza under their prior plan, and so are disappointed when plan sponsors 
eliminate or reduce early retirement subsidies. But plan sponsors did a number of things to 
ameliorate the effects of the transitions on older workers, some of which led to other perceived 
problems. 
The Duration and Changing Nature of Wear-away in the Shift to Hybrid Plans 
One of the most controversial aspects of the transition to hybrid plans has been the 
phenomenon known as “wear-away” of benefits earned under prior plans as workers are 
transitioned to new plans. Wear-away is often characterized in nominal dollars. In the analysis 
that follows, wear-away is characterized relative to a worker's earnings at the point that it arises, 
thus allowing it to be considered more symmetrically with the accrual of benefits in both the 
prior and the replacement plans. It also allows comparison of the phenomenon that arises in the 
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shift to hybrid plans with equivalent economic treatment of early retirement subsidies for 
workers who remain employed under traditional plans beyond early-retirement eligibility. Table 
7 shows the percentage of workers with varying years of service where the transition to a hybrid 
plan resulted in some period of wear-away.  
Table 7 here 
In developing Table 7, we looked at workers ages 50 and 54 with 10, 15, and 25 years of 
service at transition. Finally we looked at each worker at two pay levels at the point of transition 
to the new plans: $50,000 and $80,000. For each of the workers, we calculated benefits at 
transition and in subsequent years until age 65. Wear-away years were those where the balance at 
the end of the year in the new plan did not exceed the accrued benefit payable under the old plan. 
The accrued benefit under the old plan was the benefit accrued at the time of transition, adjusted 
for early retirement subsidies earned after the transition. If the previous plan had an early 
retirement subsidy that took effect at age 55, a 54-year-old worker who remained with the plan 
sponsor to age 55 would have a share of the prior plan's early retirement subsidy protected. The 
protected value is the present value of the early retirement subsidy that had been earned by the 
worker at the point of transition to the new plan. 
In this analysis, we looked at workers age 54 at the time of transition to the new plan, 
because under most traditional plans such workers were right on the cusp of early retirement 
eligibility. As we noted earlier, for many workers in this situation, the wear-away phenomenon 
arises because early retirement subsidies earned under the old plan must be protected in the shift 
to the new plan. Among those generally not already eligible to receive early retirement subsidies, 
54-year-old workers would have accrued the largest early retirement benefits and thus would 
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have had the largest exposure to wear-away. We looked at 50-year-old workers to show how 
workers further away from early retirement eligibility were affected.   
In one of their papers on the hybrid pension phenomenon, Clark and Schieber (2002) 
argued that most traditional plans already included a phenomenon that is economically 
equivalent to the wear-away that occurs in the transition to hybrid plans. Consider a plan that 
provides a worker an actuarially subsidized benefit at age 62, where the value of the subsidy is 
equivalent to 1.5 years of pay. Most plans eliminate the subsidy provided at early retirement 
eligibility age by the time the worker reaches age 65. Economically, the gradual elimination of 
the early retirement subsidy is virtually identical to wear-away in the transition to hybrid plans. 
In the case posited here, it is the equivalent of a tax on earnings for a worker who continues to 
work between the ages of 62 and 65. Eliminating a subsidy worth 1.5 year’s pay over three years 
would be equivalent to a tax of roughly 50 percent of the worker's earnings during those years. 
Of the 77 firms analyzed here, all but two of the prior plans featured early retirement 
subsidies. Among the 75 plans with such subsidies, long-service workers faced the prospect of 
reduced subsidies from working beyond some age or age and service combination. For example, 
in 37.7 percent of the plans, a worker with 25 years of service at age 55 would have realized 
some erosion of the age-55, early retirement subsidy if he or she continued working until age 60. 
The subsidies would have been reduced in 72.8 percent of the plans for employees who 
continued to work from ages 60 to 62. And the subsidies in 96.2 percent of the plans would have 
been reduced for continued work between the ages of 62 and 65. 
Table 8 compares the wear-away periods for long-career workers in the transition to their 
new hybrid plans with those under their former traditional plans. Because there is little difference 
by salary level, we focus on a worker earning $50,000. The two workers affected by the 
 
 
27
transition to a hybrid plan are taken from Table 7. The right-hand column in Table 8 presents the 
prospects for a worker just turning age 55 with 30 years of service under the prior plans. This age 
and service combination is likely to have faced the largest potential early retirement subsidies 
across the range of plans and would thus have faced the largest potential wear-away of these 
subsidies.   
Table 8 here 
For all three of the workers in Table 8, we look at the potential wear-away periods they 
would encounter by working up to ten additional years. In most cases, the duration of wear-away 
was less than five years in the transition to hybrid plans. For the older workers in the examples, 
the early retirement subsidy was granted at transition, but its value eroded over time. In a plan 
that states benefit values in terms of an accumulated amount, the erosion of the subsidy becomes 
very apparent because the value of the account remains constant.   
A small number of plans had extended periods of wear-away for the three workers in 
Table 8 during the transition. For the most part, plans with more than six years of wear-away 
were adopted more than a decade ago. In a couple of cases, the protracted period of wear-away 
amounted to the equivalent of freezing the old plan. In most cases with protracted wear-away, 
the plan sponsor reduced plan costs significantly in the shift from a traditional to a hybrid plan. 
An example is the case depicted earlier in Figure 4. In a couple of cases like this, what created 
the extended wear-away was using a high interest rate to calculate the initial balance in cash 
balance plans. This phenomenon was generally eliminated with the 1994 passage of GATT. 
The duration of wear-away is only one of its dimensions; the other is magnitude. 
Referring back to Figure 3, suppose that the accrued and protected benefit from the prior plan 
was larger than the initial formula balance in the new hybrid plan by one-half year’s pay at 
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transition for a hypothetical worker. Further, assume that in this particular case, the sponsor froze 
the accrued benefit from the prior plan until the balance under the new plan formula caught up to 
it. Finally, assume that it took the hypothetical worker four additional years of work under the 
new plan until the balance equaled the frozen benefit from the old plan. The cumulative value 
that would be worn away in this case is one-half year’s pay. The wear-away rate would be 0.125 
percent per year for up to four years (i.e., 0.50 year’s pay ÷ 4 years = 0.125) if the worker 
continued employment under the new plan. In Table 9, we show the wear-away rates in the 
transition to hybrid plans for the same workers as were used to construct Table 7. The rates are 
stated as a percentage of the annual wage for a prototypical worker at the time of the transition to 
the hybrid plan. 
Table 9 here 
The top panel of the table considers workers transitioned to hybrid plans at two different 
age and pay levels. It is clear from the table that workers further away from early retirement 
eligibility were not hit as hard by the wear-away phenomenon as those right at early retirement 
age in the prior plans. There are some slight differences in the wear-away rates for the workers at 
the two different earnings levels, but these are relatively minor compared to the differences 
based on age at transition. Although nearly half the plans imposed no wear-away for the 54-year-
old worker, and 83 percent imposed no wear-away for 50-year-old workers, the marginal wear-
away rates in a small number of plans were quite high, reaching more than 50 percent of annual 
pay in a couple of cases. Looking at these rates on an annual basis does give rise to equity issues 
when one considers that workers are paying payroll taxes, income taxes and incurring work-
related expenses. Adding a pension wear-away that costs the equivalent of 30 to 50 percent of 
pay makes the marginal rewards for work rather paltry.   
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Comparing the wear-away rates for the workers in the top part of Table 9 with those in 
the bottom shows that workers with less tenure at the time of transition to the new plans were 
less affected by wear-away than those with longer service. A larger share of the workers at the 
15-year tenure level were not hit at all by wear-away, and those who were generally had lower 
wear-away rates than their longer-tenured counterparts.  Given that wear-away had its largest 
impact for folks right at early retirement eligibility in most cases, it is not surprising that wear-
away has generated such adverse employee reactions. But again, the wear-away in the transition 
to hybrid plans should be considered in relation to the magnitude of wear-away in the workers’ 
previous plans. 
Table 10 shows the rates at which early retirement subsidies were worn away in the prior 
traditional plans. As in the case of the hybrid plans, the rates in Table 10 are stated as a 
percentage of the annual wage for a prototypical worker. In this case, we considered a worker 
with 30 years of service at age 55 because that age and service combination poses the maximum 
wear-away exposure under most traditional pensions plans. 
Table 10 here 
The first observation in comparing the wear-away rates in Tables 9 and 10 is that the 
wear-away rates created by the transition to hybrid plans were no higher than those in the prior 
plans. This observation, however, obscures the specific plan changes adopted by individual 
employers. Two of the plan sponsors had no early retirement subsidies in their prior plans and 
did not create any wear-away in their conversion to hybrid plans. Another 47 percent of the plans 
did have early retirement subsidies in their original plans but their conversions did not create 
wear-away. In the traditional plans, the average value of the early retirement subsidies at their 
peak was 1.09 times one year’s pay. On average, the wear-away period for these subsidies was 
 
 
30
6.8 years. In these cases, the shift to hybrid plans appears to have largely eliminated an 
extremely widespread wear-away phenomenon. 
The concern about wear-away focuses on the 51 percent of plans that had some period of 
wear-away for certain workers. But all the prior plans featured in this part of the analysis had 
early retirement incentives in their prior plans, so they already had wear-away features embedded 
in them. Table 11 compares the wear-away for the prior plans with that in the replacement plans. 
The plans have been grouped by the duration over which the retirement subsidies in the original 
plans were worn away by continued employment beyond the point at which the early retirement 
subsidy peaked. Comparing the average duration of wear-away in the hybrid plans with that in 
the original plans indicates that in most cases, the shift to a hybrid plan shortened the period of 
wear-away. The one exception is where wear-away of the early retirement subsidy occurred in 
less than five years. This is partly driven by one extreme outlier: a plan that was effectively 
frozen for many workers in the transition to a hybrid plan. After eliminating the outlier, the 
average duration of wear-away in the transition to hybrid plans is five years. 
Table 11 here 
The other element of Table 11 for comparison is the average peak retirement subsidies 
under the original plans compared to the cumulative wear-away in the hybrid plans, reflecting 
the maximum cumulative wear-away that workers would face in the two plans. Again, in the first 
category, the average went up substantially. In the other cases, with one exception, they 
generally declined moderately. The exception was the single plan where the early retirement 
subsidy in the original plan was worn away over a nine-year period, and the increase was less 
than one-quarter’s year of pay. Three of the four plans in the first line of the table represent plan 
conversions that were coupled with significant cutbacks in plan costs. One was a plan conversion 
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by a company struggling to avoid bankruptcy. Another was a hospital also struggling to remain 
economically viable.   
Overall, our evidence suggests that the shift to hybrid plans did more to reduce the wear-
away phenomenon than to create or exacerbate it, with some possible exceptions in cases where 
the plan sponsor set out to reduce costs. However, comparing Tables 9 and 10 indicates that 
where wear-away was part of the transition to a hybrid plan, workers in their late 50s faced 
higher wear-away rates in the conversion to the new plan than they would have faced under their 
old plans up until age 60 or so. Wear-away rates were at or under 25 percent of annual pay for 
workers between the ages of 55 and 60 in the prior traditional plans, but were more than 25 
percent of annual pay in nearly one-fifth of the transitions to hybrid plans.  
But comparing the wear-away rates for workers who were age 54 when their plans were 
converted with the rates they would have faced under their old plans beyond age 60 gives a very 
different picture. The traditional plans had marginally higher wear-away patterns for workers 
between the ages of 60 and 62  and much higher rates for those between the ages of 62 and 65 
 than the rates embedded in the hybrid plan transitions. It appears that the conversions to 
hybrid plans tended to front load the wear-away phenomenon, which was usually more heavily 
back loaded in traditional plans. 
Undoubtedly shifting the wear-away forward in workers’ lifetimes had something to do 
with the outcry against it. But the more noticeable presence of wear-away in hybrid plans almost 
certainly fueled the negative reactions. Under the old plans, the erosion of the early retirement 
subsidies would have been less explicit, because the benefit is typically stated as an annuity 
rather than as an accumulated balance. In traditional plans, the annual benefit payable at 
retirement may continue to increase even as early retirement subsidies are eliminated, even 
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though the present value of the subsidy and in some cases even the present value of the annuity 
declines with continued work. In plans where the benefit is stated as a lump sum, its failure to 
increase with additional service is unequivocally obvious. 
Table 11 shows the cumulative potential exposure to wear-away for workers right at early 
retirement where wear-away was a phenomenon both before and after the transition to a hybrid 
form. Workers would incur the full brunt of this wear-away only if they worked all the way 
through the wear-away period. The timing and incidence would vary somewhat from plan to 
plan, depending on the specific plan characteristics. In nearly half the cases, employers 
structured the new plans to make the wear-away issue moot. In the remaining plans, the 
cumulative wear-away was generally less in the replacement plans than in the prior plans. 
A significant element of wear-away ties back to the discussion about eliminating early 
retirement subsidies in traditional pensions in the shift to hybrid plans. Many U.S. large 
employers are moving away from policies put in place to encourage workers to terminate 
employment somewhere between the ages of 55 and 60. In doing so, they have moved the wear-
away periods in their traditional pensions forward in their shift to hybrid plans. But the vast 
majority of plan sponsors have taken measures to ameliorate the effects of moving the wear-
away periods forward as discussed in the following section. In addition, after the transition to 
these new plans is complete, it will mark the end of the wear-away phenomenon that has been 
widespread in U.S. defined benefit plans for the last 30 to 40 years. 
Transition Benefits Provided to Existing Workers in the Shift to Hybrid Plans 
The pattern of benefit adjustments in Table 4 suggests that older workers or workers with 
some tenure at the point of conversion to hybrid plans fared differently in some of the 
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conversions than other workers. Also the discussion about wear-away suggests that many 
sponsors provided transition benefits so that workers would not experience wear-away periods. 
In 88 percent of the plans in this study, the plan sponsor provided some form of transition 
benefit for affected workers. The nature of the transition benefits varied across plan sponsors and 
for workers based on their age and tenure under the prior plan at the point of conversion. Table 
12 shows how conversions to hybrid plans would have affected workers who were age 50 at the 
time of conversion with 25 years of service under their old plan if no special provisions had been 
made. The table indicates the distribution of benefits, including the transition provisions. It also 
shows benefits as a percent of prior benefits that would have been payable at various ages under 
the pre-conversion plans. 
The transition benefits significantly ameliorated the adverse effects of the plan changes. 
Without transition benefits, in 49.5 percent of the hybrid plans, 50-year-old workers with 25 
years of service who retired at age 55 would have received less than 75 percent of the benefit 
they would have received under their prior plan. Fully 78 percent of the plans would have 
provided a smaller benefit than the prior plan. With transition benefits factored in, however, only 
18.2 percent of the plans paid a benefit less than three-quarters of the benefit in the prior plan. 
Only about one-third of the plans paid less than the prior benefit level for the worker described 
above. The implications of transition benefits were similar for workers who continued to work 
until later ages, up until age 65. 
Table 12 here 
Table 13 shows the effects of 77 plan conversions on a set of hypothetical workers based 
on their age and service when their employer adopted a hybrid plan. The pattern in the table is 
clear. The closer a worker was to retirement and the longer the period of service before the plan 
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conversion, the greater the transition protection offered by the plan sponsor. Nearly two-thirds of 
50-year-old workers with 25 years of service were fully grandfathered in their old plan benefit if 
they retire at age 55 under their new plan. For those who wait until age 65, however, the share of 
grandfathered workers drops to less than half, 46.7 percent. For workers age 50 at the time of 
conversation, the likelihood of being grandfathered or receiving higher benefits rose with years 
of service. Just over half, 54.5 percent, of workers aged 50 with 10 years of service at conversion 
were fully grandfathered for retirement at age 55. Only about one-third of workers at this age and 
service would be grandfathered in their old plan benefit if they wait until age 65 to retire. 
Table 13 here 
The bottom panel in the table shows the benefits for a 40-year-old worker with 10 years 
of service at the time of plan conversion. Note the benefits are shown for a slightly different set 
of ages than those for the 50-year-old workers in the table. For the younger workers, the pattern 
of benefits under a hybrid plan for those who terminate employment before early retirement age 
under traditional plans tends to be extremely favorable. Even workers fairly far along into a 
career with some substantial tenure will benefit from the shift to hybrid plans if they terminate 
employment before typical retirement ages in traditional plans. For these younger workers with 
relatively short tenures at the time of plan conversion, grandfathering of benefits at early and 
normal retirement ages was not as generous as it was for their older counterparts. Slightly more 
than two-thirds of the 50-year-olds with 10 years of service received some grandfather protection 
or actually came out better off under the new plan. Only half the 40-year-olds will fare so well if 
they delay retirement to age 60. 
Table 14 provides somewhat more detail on two of the workers in Table 13. In each case, 
we assume the 50-year-old worker earns $60,000 per year. In the first and second panels of Table 
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14, the worker has 25 years of service, and in the third and fourth ten years of service. The first 
and third panels in the table reflect only changes to the defined benefit plan in the transition. The 
second and fourth panels include enhancements made to defined contribution plans in 
conjunction with the shift to a hybrid plan, which can help ameliorate the potential adverse 
effects of such a shift. Of the 77 plans in the analysis, 24 introduced some enhancement to their 
defined contribution plan in conjunction with adopting a hybrid plan. In calculating the effects of 
the defined contribution changes, we assumed workers would take full advantage of the 
enhanced benefits provided by their employers. The added benefits reflect only the added 
employer contributions. The effects of adding in defined contribution plan changes in this case 
were quite moderate, especially for workers affected late in their careers. 
Table 14 here 
Table 15 is similar to Table 14, but it includes younger workers with fewer years of 
service at the time of the shift to a hybrid plan. At pre-retirement ages, most of these workers 
were better off under the new plans than the prior ones. Although fewer of these workers were 
eligible for transition benefits than their older counterparts, a substantial number of plans 
provided transition benefits of some sort even for these relatively young workers. 
Table 15 here 
Winning or Losing in the Shift to a Hybrid Plan 
Throughout much of this discussion, we have talked about benefit reductions experienced 
by some workers in the shift from traditional defined benefit plans to hybrid plans. We have 
looked at the overall magnitude of these reductions, the extent to which they can be explained by 
the elimination of early retirement subsidies, and the extent to which transition benefits 
ameliorated the reductions. We do not want to downplay the importance of the findings 
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presented here, but it is important to view them in an objective context. These benefit reductions 
are reductions against prior plans. While any change to workers’ compensation packages raises 
certain equity questions, there have been questions about the fairness of accrual patterns in 
traditional pensions for years. Specifically, it is well known that these plans favor workers with 
longer job tenure over workers who change jobs more frequently. Hybrid plans typically do not 
provide the same relative advantage to workers with long tenures ending with retirement, 
compared to those with shorter tenures or who leave before retirement eligibility. Hybrid plans 
tend to distribute benefits more evenly than traditional plans. 
In a number of highly publicized cases, some workers who have been shifted to a hybrid 
pension have been highly vocal about the inequity of the shift. In some cases, these workers will 
ultimately accrue less benefits under their new plan than they would have under the old, and 
from that perspective, it is easy to understand why they are upset. Traditional defined benefit 
plans have generally provided a tremendous advantage to a relatively small number of workers. 
While some advantage appears to prevail under the new hybrid plans for workers who stay to 
retirement age, hybrid plans eliminate much of the differential relative to workers departing 
before early retirement eligibility. If the focus is exclusively on those who were formerly big 
winners under traditional plans, the complaints are understandable. But focusing on the total 
distribution of benefits under the hybrid plans shifts the perspective considerably. One can only 
make the case for unfairness to those adversely affected in the shift to hybrid plans if one agrees 
that traditional pension plans were fair to begin with, and that the accrual reflected in Table 6 is 
somehow inequitable for long-service workers. 
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Table 1. Features of Alternative Employer-Sponsored Retirement Plans 
 
 Defined Defined  Hybrid 
plan 
Plan feature benefit plan contribution 
plan 
Hybrid plan tendency 
     
Employer 
contributes 
Virtually always Sometimes Virtually always DB 
Employee 
contributes 
Very rarely Virtually 
always 
Very rarely DB 
Participation Automatic Employee 
choice 
Automatic DB 
Contribution level Automatic Employee 
choice 
Automatic DB 
PBGC Insurance Yes but capped Not needed Yes but capped DB 
Early departure 
penalty 
Yes No No DC 
Benefits easily 
portable 
No Yes Yes DC 
Annual 
communication 
Benefit at end of 
career 
Current balance Current balance DC 
Retirement 
incentives 
Occur at specific 
ages 
Neutral Most are neutral DC 
Accrual of benefits Loaded to career 
end 
Level over 
career 
Level or back 
loaded 
Mixed 
Financial market 
risks 
Employer bears Employee bears Shared Mixed 
Longevity 
insurance 
Typically yes Typically no Not often taken Mixed 
Source: Developed by author. 
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Table 2. Benefits under Hybrid Plans Relative to Benefits under Prior Traditional Defined 
Benefit Plans for Selected Workers  
 
 New hire age 30 Worker age 50 with 20 years 
Hybrid plan 
benefit 
at transition service at transition 
 as a percentage 
of 
  
 prior plan's 
benefit 
At age 40 At age 60 At age 50 At age 60 
 Percent of 
plans 
Percent of 
plans 
Percent of 
plans 
Percent of 
plans 
25 to 49     0.0    10.4     0.0     7.8 
50 to 74     1.3    41.6     1.3   23.4 
75 to 99     0.0    26.0     5.2   23.4 
100 exactly     2.6     5.2   20.8   24.7 
100 to 124     3.9     9.1   20.8   18.2 
125 to 149     5.2     6.5   19.5     2.6 
150 to 199    23.4     1.3   16.9     0.0 
200 to 299    41.6     0.0   14.3     0.0 
300 to 399    15.6     0.0     1.3     0.0 
400 or more     6.5     0.0     0.0     0.0 
     
Minimum    68.5   25.4   68.4   37.4 
Maximum 816.7 150.0 301.1 144.3 
Mean 250.0   77.9 144.0   86.6 
Standard 
deviation 
126.3   28.3   50.9   23.0 
Source: Author’s computation from data provided by Watson Wyatt Worldwide. 
 
 
 
39
Table 3. Benefits under Pension Equity and Cash Balance Plans Relative to Benefits under 
Prior Traditional Defined Benefit Plans for a Worker Hired at Age 30 
 
Hybrid plan 
benefit 
Benefits at age 40 Benefits at age 60 
 as a percentage 
of 
  
 prior plan's 
benefit 
PEP plan Cash balance 
plan 
PEP plan Cash balance 
plan 
 Percent of 
plans 
Percent of 
plans 
Percent of 
plans 
Percent of 
plans 
25 to 49     0.0      0.0   10.4     8.7 
50 to 74     0.0      2.2   41.6   47.8 
75 to 99     0.0      0.0   26.0   19.6 
100 exactly     3.2     2.2     5.2     4.3 
100 to 124     6.5     2.2     9.1   10.9 
125 to 149     6.5     4.3     6.5     6.5 
150 to 199    25.8   21.7     1.3     2.2 
200 to 299    38.7   43.5     0.0     0.0 
300 to 399    12.9   17.5     0.0     0.0 
400 or more     3.2     6.5     0.0     0.0 
     
Minimum  100.0   68.5   25.4   29.9 
Maximum 816.7 783.5 150.0 150.0 
Mean 243.1 254.7   77.9   78.7 
Standard 
deviation 
133.6 122.4   28.3   29.2 
Source: Author’s computation from data provided by Watson Wyatt Worldwide. 
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Table 4. Benefit Reductions Attributable to the Elimination of Early Retirement Subsidies 
in the Shift from Traditional Pensions to Hybrid Plans 
 
 At age 55 At age 60 At age 62 
 (Percent of plans) 
New hire at age 30 at a beginning salary of $40,000 
Benefit cut exceeds subsidy 15.6 41.6 49.4 
Benefit cut less than subsidy 42.9 27.3 22.1 
Benefit maintained or 
increased 
41.6 31.2 28.6 
Worker at age 40 with 10 years of service earning $50,000 at 
transition to new plan 
Benefit cut exceeds subsidy 15.6 39.0 48.1 
Benefit cut less than subsidy 45.5 28.6 19.5 
Benefit maintained or 
increased 
39.0 32.5 32.5 
Worker at age 50 with 20 years of service earning $60,000 at 
transition to new plan 
Benefit cut exceeds subsidy 13.0 27.3 37.7 
Benefit cut less than subsidy 23.4 27.3 20.8 
Benefit maintained or 
increased 
63.6 45.5 41.6 
Source:  Author’s computation from data provided by Watson Wyatt Worldwide. 
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Table 5. Winners and Losers and Gains and Losses for Workers Shifted into a Hybrid 
Pension with the Same Cost as the Prior Plan 
Tenure at Age at time of conversion to the hybrid plan  
time of 20 to 29.9 30 to 39.9 40 to 49.9 50 to 54.9 55 to 59.9 60 to 65  
conversion Percentage of workers whose benefits increased or stayed the same 
0 to 4.9 99.8 88.9 85.4 91.2 93.7 95.1 91.5 
5 to 9.9  99.8 86.6 74.0 72.7 82.5 92.4 83.1 
10 to 14.9  98.0 83.8 66.3 67.0 70.4 85.7 74.8 
15 to 19.9  80.0 66.2 70.3 71.3 85.9 71.4 
20 to 24.9  65.8 67.9 68.3 69.3 85.0 68.9 
25 to 29.9   69.4 63.7 71.1 83.6 68.8 
30 +   68.6 66.7 66.2 85.5 71.4 
   Total 99.7 85.8 71.9 70.3 72.7 87.0 79.4 
 Percentage increase in lifetime benefits for the above  
0 to 4.9 22.5 26.6 25.0 20.8 16.8 12.5 21.7 
5 to 9.9  23.3 22.4 21.7 19.1 14.7   9.8 18.9 
10 to 14.9  24.3 18.4 20.2 16.7 14.8   9.3 18.0 
15 to 19.9  20.0 20.0 17.9 16.5   9.7 16.7 
20 to 24.9  21.4 19.4 17.0 14.8   8.1 15.8 
25 to 29.9   17.9 17.3 14.4 10.0 14.5 
30 +   17.0 15.7 14.6   8.3 13.1 
 Percentage of workers whose benefits decreased 
0 to 4.9 0.2 11.1 14.6   8.8   6.3   4.9   8.5 
5 to 9.9  0.2 13.4 26.0 27.3 17.5   7.6 16.9 
10 to 14.9  2.0 16.2 33.7 33.0 29.6 14.3 25.2 
15 to 19.9 0.0 20.0 33.8 29.7 28.7 14.1 28.6 
20 to 24.9 0.0 34.2 32.1 31.7 30.7 15.0 31.1 
25 to 29.9 0.0 0.0 30.6 36.3 28.9 16.4 31.2 
30 + 0.0 0.0 31.4 33.3 33.8 14.5 28.6 
Total 0.3 14.2 28.1 29.7 27.3 13.0 20.6 
 Percentage decrease in lifetime benefits for those whose benefits decreased 
0 to 4.9 14.1 13.6 17.3 13.4   8.8 4.8  
5 to 9.9  10.2 14.5 21.0 18.2 11.7 4.1  
10 to 14.9    0.3 14.8 22.0 21.2 13.6 5.8  
15 to 19.9  12.5 23.0 20.4 15.9 6.2  
20 to 24.9    8.6 19.2 19.3 11.9 6.9  
25 to 29.9   20.9 19.1 14.4 4.8  
30 +   17.7 18.6 14.1 6.4  
Source: Brown et al., (2000). 
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Table 6. Future Pension Accruals as a Percentage of Pay for Workers Shifted into a Hybrid 
Plan with the Same Cost as the Prior Plan by Age and Service at Date of Shift 
 
Tenure at Age at time of conversion to a hybrid plan 
the time of  
conversion 20 to 29.9 30 to 39.9 40 to 49.9 50 to 54.9 55 to 59.9 60 to 65 
 Future pension accrual rate as a percent of pay for those winning or held 
harmless 
0 to 4.9 1.98 3.26 4.80 6.42 6.43 6.60 
5 to 9.9  2.17 3.24 4.75 6.19 7.02 7.41 
10 to 14.9  2.57 3.37 4.52 5.81 6.70 7.74 
15 to 19.9  3.49 4.51 6.16 6.48 7.75 
20 to 24.9  4.13 4.62 6.01 6.98 7.32 
25 to 29.9   4.95 6.26 5.78 7.61 
30 +   5.51 5.84 6.29 6.55 
 Future pension accrual rate as a percent of pay for losers 
0 to 4.9 4.27 5.31 6.30 7.76 8.36 9.01 
5 to 9.9  4.80 5.29 6.25 7.71 8.43 9.08 
10 to 14.9   5.33 6.25 7.71 8.47 9.13 
15 to 19.9  5.40 6.24 7.59 8.50 9.14 
20 to 24.9  5.39 6.30 7.60 8.53 9.13 
25 to 29.9   6.68 7.62 8.53 9.14 
30 +   7.12 7.69 8.54 9.13 
Source: Brown et al., (2000).  
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Table 7. Percentage of Plans with Wear-away for Selected Workers 
 
Duration of wear-away Annual pay level 
 phenomenon $80,000 $50,000 $80,000 $50,000 
 Age 54 at transition Age 50 at transition 
25 years of service   
    None       49.3 %     49.3 %       83.1 %       85.7 % 
    1 year    7.8    9.1    3.9    2.6 
    2 years    7.8    6.5   1.3   2.6 
    3 years    7.8    9.1   1.3   0.0 
    4 years 15.6 14.3   2.6   3.9 
    5 years   2.6   3.9   1.3   0.0 
    6 years    3.9   2.6   0.0   0.0 
    7 to 9 years   2.6   2.6   2.6   2.6 
    10 years or more   2.6   2.6   3.9   2.6 
15 years of service     
    None 58.4 58.4 87.0 87.0 
    1 year 10.4 10.4   1.3   2.6 
    2 years    9.1 11.7   2.6   2.6 
    3 years    3.9   3.9   3.9   2.6 
    4 years    7.8   5.2   0.0   1.3 
    5 years    3.9   6.5   1.3   0.0 
    6 years     2.6   0.0   1.3   1.3 
    7 to 9 years    2.6   2.6   0.0   1.3 
    10 years or more    1.3   1.3   2.6   1.3 
10 years of service     
    None 57.1 56.1 87.0 88.3 
    1 year 14.3 16.9   3.9   2.6 
    2 years   9.1 10.4   1.3   2.6 
    3 years   7.8   5.2   2.6   1.3 
    4 years   5.2   5.2   2.6   1.3 
    5 years   1.3   1.3   0.0   1.3 
    6 years    2.6   1.3   0.0   0.0 
    7 to 9 years   1.3   1.3   1.3   0.0 
    10 years or more   1.3   2.6   1.3   2.6 
Source:  Author’s computation from data provided by Watson Wyatt Worldwide. 
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Table 8. Periods of Wear-away in the Transition to Hybrid Plans Compared with Those in 
Prior Plans 
 
   
 
Workers covered in hybrid 
plan 
Worker in 
prior 
Duration of wear-
away Age 54 at Age 50 at plan as of  
phenomenon transition transition turning age 55 
    
None   49.3 %     85.7 %         2.6 % 
1 year 9.1 2.6    0.0 
2 years 6.5 2.6    1.3 
3 years 9.1 0    5.2 
4 years 14.3 3.9    5.2 
5 years 3.9 0 23.4 
6 years 2.6 0 11.7 
7 to 9 years 2.6 2.6 14.3 
10 years or more 2.6 2.6 22.1 
Source: Author’s computations from data provided by Watson Wyatt Worldwide. 
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Table 9. Percentage of Plans with Specified Annual Wear-Away Rates in the Transition 
from Traditional Defined Benefit to Hybrid Plans, as a Percentage of Annual Earnings for 
Selected Workers 
Wear-away 
rate Annual pay level at transition 
as a percentage  
of annual pay $80,000 $50,000 $80,000 $50,000 
 Age 54 at transition Age 50 at transition 
   
25 years of service at transition 
    0 % 
       49.3 
% 
      49.3 
% 
     83.1 
%      85.7 % 
    0.01 to 4.95    3.9    6.5   3.9  2.6 
    5.0 to 9.95    9.1    3.9   2.6  1.3 
    10.0 to 
14.95    5.2 10.4   3.9  3.9 
    15.0 to 
19.95  10.4    9.1   1.3  1.3 
    20.0 to 
24.95    1.3    6.5   1.3  2.6 
    25.0 to 
29.95    7.8    5.2   1.3  0.0 
    30.0 to 
34.95    5.2    3.9   0.0  1.3 
    35.0 to 
39.95    3.9    2.6   1.3  1.3 
    40.0 to 
44.95    0.0    0.0   1.3  0.0 
    45.0 to 
49.95    1.3    1.3   0.0  0.0 
    50.0 to 
54.95    2.6    1.3   0.0  0.0 
15 years of service at transition 
    0 %  58.4 59.7 88.3 87.0 
    0.01 to 4.95    9.1   7.8   1.3   1.3 
    5.0 to 9.95    7.8   7.8   6.5   7.8 
    10.0 to 
14.95    9.1 10.4   1.3   2.6 
    15.0 to 
19.95    9.1 10.4   2.6   1.3 
    20.0 to 
24.95    3.9   3.9   
    25.0 to 
29.95    2.6    
Source:  Author’s computations from data provided by Watson Wyatt Worldwide. 
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Table 10. Annual Wear-Away Rates of Early Retirement Subsidies under PriorTraditional 
Defined Benefit Plans for Plans Converted to Hybrid Plans, as a Percentage of Annual 
Earnings for a Long-Service Worker 
 
Wear-away rate Ages 55 to 60 Ages 60 to 62 Ages 62 to 65 
  (Percent of plans) 
0.0      48.1 %       24.7 %       3.9 % 
0.05 to 4.95 29.9 18.2   7.8 
5.0 to 9.95 13.0 19.5 18.2 
10.0 to 14.95   0.0   9.1   9.1 
15.0 to 19.95   7.8   7.8   9.1 
20.0 to 24.95   1.3   3.9   9.1 
25.0 to 29.95   0.0   5.2   7.8 
30.0 to 34.95   0.0   5.2   9.1 
35.0 to 39.95   0.0   5.2 13.0 
40.0 to 49.95   0.0   1.3 11.7 
50.0 to 54.9   0.0   0.0   1.3 
Source:  Author’s computations from data provided by Watson Wyatt Worldwide. 
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Table 11. Comparison of the Magnitude and Duration of Wear-away in the Shift to a 
Hybrid Plan with that in Prior Plans for a Worker Age 54 with 25 Years of Service 
 
Situation in prior traditional plans   
  Average for hybrid plans 
Duration of  
Average 
peak   
wear-away 
in 
Number 
of retirement  Duration of Cumulative 
in years plans subsidy  wear-away wear-away 
      
LT 5 4 0.97  6.75 2.26 
5 10 1.04  3.30 0.94 
6 5 1.05  4.00 1.03 
7 4 0.95  2.75 0.48 
8 6 1.62  4.67 1.56 
9 1 1.83  6.00 2.06 
10 9 0.73  2.78 0.43 
Source:  Author’s computations from data provided by Watson Wyatt Worldwide. 
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Table 12. Benefits under Hybrid Plans Relative to Prior Plans for Workers Aged 50 with 25 
Years of Service with Salary of $60,000 at Conversion (Note: Benefit changes include 
marginal improvements in defined contribution plans) 
 
 Percentage of plans 
Hybrid and 
transition 
 
  benefit as 
percentage 
At age 55 At age 60 At age 65 
  of prior plan 
benefit 
Hybrid Including Hybrid Including Hybrid Including 
 benefit 
only 
transition benefit 
only 
transition benefit 
only 
transition 
       
Less than 50 
percent 
18.2   3.9 20.8   6.5 15.6   6.5 
50 to 74.9 percent 31.2 14.3 33.7 19.5 35.1 19.5 
75 to 99.9 percent 28.6 15.6 27.3 24.7 23.4 23.4 
100 to 124.9 
percent 
15.6 51.9 13.0 41.6 16.9 39.0 
125 to 149.9 
percent 
  5.2 11.7   5.2   7.8   7.8   9.1 
150 or more   1.3   2.6   0.0   0.0   1.3   2.6 
Source:  Author’s computation from data provided by Watson Wyatt Worldwide. 
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Table 13. Effects of Adoption of Hybrid Pensions on Benefit Levels of Hypothetical 
Workers Based on Age and Tenure at the Time of Plan Conversion (Note: Benefit changes 
do not include marginal improvements in defined contribution plans) 
 Age at termination of employment 
  
Age and service at time of conversion At age 55 At age 60 At age 62 At age 65 
 (percent of plans) 
Age 50 with 25 years of service and $60,000 annual 
salary 
  
 No transition benefit & total benefits fall   3.9   7.8     9.1 15.6 
 Transition benefit but total benefits fall 32.5 42.9 41.6 37.7 
 Fully grandfathered or benefits increase 63.6 49.3 49.3 46.7 
     
Age 50 with 20 years of service and $60,000 annual 
salary 
   
 No transition benefit & total benefits fall   6.5 13.0 14.3 18.2 
 Transition benefit but total benefits fall 31.2 42.9 45.5 39.0 
 Fully grandfathered or benefits increase 62.3 44.1 40.2 42.8 
     
Age 50 with 15 years of service and $60,000 annual 
salary 
   
 No transition benefit & total benefits fall   9.1 16.9 18.2 19.5 
 Transition benefit but total benefits fall 29.9 40.3 44.2 41.6 
 Fully grandfathered or benefits increase 61.0 42.8 37.6 38.9 
     
Age 50 with 10 years of service and $60,000 annual 
salary 
   
 No transition benefit & total benefits fall 19.5 27.3 31.2 31.2 
 Transition benefit but total benefits fall 26.0 33.8 35.1 35.1 
 Fully grandfathered or benefits increase 54.5 38.9 33.7 33.7 
     
 At age 50 At age 55 At age 60 At age 65 
Age 40 with 10 years of service and $50,000 annual 
salary 
   
 No transition benefit & total benefits fall   9.1 49.4 54.5 55.8 
 Transition benefit but total benefits fall   3.9 14.3 16.9 16.9 
 Fully grandfathered or benefits increase 87.0 36.4 28.6 27.3 
Source:  Author’s computation from data provided by Watson Wyatt Worldwide. 
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Table 14.  Effects of Adoption of Hybrid Pensions on Benefit Levels of Hypothetical 
Workers Based on Age and Tenure at the Time of Plan Conversion 
 
 At age 55 At age 60 At age 62 At age 65
  
(percent of plans) 
Age 50 with 25 years of service, including only the DB changes  
 No transition benefit & total benefits 
fall 
  3.9   7.8   9.1 15.6 
 Transition benefit but total benefits 
fall 
32.5 42.9 41.6 37.7 
 Fully grandfathered in old benefit 31.2 20.8 20.8 20.8 
 No transition benefit & total benefits 
rise 
14.3 11.7 13.0 13.0 
 Transition benefit & total benefits rise 18.2 16.9 15.6 13.0 
     
Age 50 with 25 years of service, including DB & DC changes  
 No transition benefit & total benefits 
fall 
  3.9   6.5   9.1 13.0 
 Transition benefit but total benefits 
fall 
28.6 42.9 41.6 35.1 
 Fully grandfathered in old benefit 24.7 16.9 15.6 15.6 
 No transition benefit & total benefits 
rise 
14.3 13.0 13.0 15.6 
 Transition benefit & total benefits rise 28.6 20.8 20.8 20.8 
     
Age 50 with 10 years of service, including only the DB changes  
 No transition benefit & total benefits 
fall 
19.5 27.3 31.2 31.2 
 Transition benefit but total benefits 
fall 
26.0 33.8 35.1 35.1 
 Fully grandfathered in old benefit 20.8 15.6 14.3 14.3 
 No transition benefit & total benefits 
rise 
18.2 15.6 14.3 14.3 
 Transition benefit & total benefits rise 15.6   7.8   5.2   5.2 
     
Age 50 with 10 years of service, including DB and DC changes  
 No transition benefit & total benefits 
fall 
19.5 27.3 31.2 28.6 
 Transition benefit but total benefits 
fall 
20.8 31.2 33.8 32.5 
 Fully grandfathered in old benefit 22.1 15.6 11.7 11.7 
 No transition benefit & total benefits 
rise 
18.2 15.6 14.3 16.9 
 Transition benefit & total benefits rise 19.5 10.4 9.1 10.4 
Source:  Author’s computation from data provided by Watson Wyatt Worldwide. 
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Table 15.  Effects of Adoption of Hybrid Pensions on Benefit Levels of Hypothetical 
Workers Based on Age and Tenure at the Time of Plan Conversion 
  At age 50 At age 55 At age 60 At age 65 
   
  (percent of plans) 
Age 40 with 10 years of service, including only the DB changes   
 No transition benefit & total benefits 
fall 
  9.1 49.4 54.5 55.8 
 Transition benefit but total benefits 
fall 
  3.9 14.3 16.9 16.9 
 Fully grandfathered in old benefit   5.2   7.8   7.8 10.4 
 No transition benefit & total benefits 
rise 
64.9 19.5 13.0 11.7 
 Transition benefit & total benefits rise 16.9   9.1   7.8   5.2 
      
Age 40 with 10 years of service, including DB & DC changes   
 No transition benefit & total benefits 
fall 
  7.8 48.1 50.6 49.4 
 Transition benefit but total benefits 
fall 
  2.6 13.0 16.9 14.3 
 Fully grandfathered in old benefit   5.2   9.1   6.5   7.8 
 No transition benefit & total benefits 
rise 
66.2 18.2 16.9 18.2 
 Transition benefit & total benefits rise 18.2 11.7   9.1 10.4 
      
Age 30 with 5 years of service, including only the DB changes   
 No transition benefit & total benefits 
fall 
14.3 53.2 58.4 54.5 
 Transition benefit but total benefits 
fall 
  3.9   7.8 10.4   5.2 
 Fully grandfathered in old benefit   1.3   5.2   5.2   6.5 
 No transition benefit & total benefits 
rise 
70.1 29.9 22.1 28.6 
 Transition benefit & total benefits rise 10.4   3.9 3.9   5.2 
      
Age 30 with 5 years of service, including DB and DC changes   
 No transition benefit & total benefits 
fall 
  6.5 42.9 48.1 41.6 
 Transition benefit but total benefits 
fall 
  3.9   7.8   7.8   3.9 
 Fully grandfathered in old benefit   1.3   5.2   6.5   5.2 
 No transition benefit & total benefits 
rise 
77.9 40.3 32.5 42.9 
 Transition benefit & total benefits rise 10.4   3.9   5.2   6.5 
Source:  Author’s computation from data provided by Watson Wyatt Worldwide. 
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Figure 1.  Value of Accrued Benefits as a Multiple of Annual Wage at Various Ages for a 
New Hire at Age 30 with a Starting Wage of $40,000 under Alternative Plans 
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Source: Derived by the author. 
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Figure 2.  Potential Benefit Accruals as a Multiple of Annual Wage for a Worker Age 50 
with 20 Years Service at Conversion under Alternative Plans 
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Source: Derived by the author. 
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Figure 3.  Potential Benefit Accruals as a Multiple of Annual Wage for a Worker Age 56 
with 31 Years of Service at Conversion under Alternative Plans 
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Source: Derived by the author. 
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Figure 4.  The Relative Role of the Elimination of Early Retirement Subsidies in the Total 
Reduction in Benefits in the Shift to a Hybrid Pension in Scenario 1 
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Source: Derived by the author. 
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Figure 5.  The Relative Role of the Elimination of Early Retirement Subsidies in the Total 
Reduction in Benefits in the Shift to a Hybrid Pension in Scenario 2 
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Source: Derived by the author. 
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Figure 6.  The Relative Role of the Elimination of Early Retirement Subsidies 
in the Total Reduction in Benefits in the Shift to a Hybrid Pension in Scenario 3 
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Source: Derived by the author. 
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Figure 7.  Distribution of Pension Values at Age 50 for a Worker with 20 Years of Service 
under Hybrid Plans Relative to Prior Traditional Pension Plans 
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Source: Brown et al., (2000). 
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Endnotes 
 
1 The analysis in this chapter draws heavily on the prior work that the authors of this text have 
undertaken with a number of other authors. Most particularly, Professor Robert Clark from North 
Carolina State University must be mentioned for his work on several prior research efforts into 
hybrid pensions. In addition, Gordon P. Goodfellow, Tomeka Hill, Richard Joss, Richard Luss, 
and Lex Miller have contributed to the earlier studies. We cite the specific materials that we have 
drawn on at various appropriate places in the text. 
2 Some plans have recently begun to offer participants in cash balance plans returns keyed to a 
range of portfolio investment options, which would create the same investment risks as exist in 
defined contribution plans where asset investment is self-directed. 
3 In making these comparisons we had to make certain assumptions about wage growth, returns 
on account balances and the like. We assumed each of the workers would realize steady wage 
growth of 4 percent per year over the calculation periods. For plans integrated with Social 
Security, we assumed the wage base would grow at a rate of 3.5 percent per year. In the case of 
cash balance plans, most of them credit interest to accumulating balances by linking to some 
index measure. For those that follow long-term Treasury yields, we credited accounts with 7 
percent interest per year. For those that follow intermediate yields, we credited them at 6.5 
percent per year. For those using short-term rates, the crediting rate used was 5.5 percent. For 
those with a stated percentage credit rate in their plan, we used the stated percentage for annual 
interest crediting. In estimating the lump-sum values of traditional plans, we used a 7 percent 
discount rate and the GAM-83 life table with a three-year setback 
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4 In order to comply with ERISA, the plan must provide the participant a benefit at least equal to 
the accrued benefit on date of conversion. The initial account balance, however, does not have to 
be at least the present value of the participant's accrued benefit.   
